Im tired, frustrated and will simply cut to the chase.
The Public Private Investment Program is a scam. George Orwell should give these asses an award for doublespeak.
Here is an excerpt from Dr. Housing Bubble that helps
Alternet – It is exasperating to watch the commission in charge of investigating last year’s financial disaster be distracted and deflected by the bankers who ripped us off.
Articles and blogs are flooding the Web, summarizing and dissecting the opening Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s chat with the four CEOs presiding over the strongest (read: luckiest recipients of federal generosity during their most troubled times) banks in the country: Lloyd Blankfein from Goldman Sachs, Jamie Dimon from JPM Chase, John Mack from Morgan Stanley and Brian Moynihan from Bank of America. (Citigroup didn’t make the cut.)
But, Wednesday morning was an exercise in how prepped bankers can deflect less-prepped commissioners’ questions with seriously delivered circular reasoning. And, it was exasperating. (Les Leopold, author of The Looting of America, provides an excellent, detailed play-by-play of the morning’s events.)
I have been writing about reinstating Glass-Steagall since I left banking in 2002. I explored how findings from the Pecora commission, which investigated the most risky bank practices during the early 1930s, contributed to the creation of a more restrained banking landscape, in which commercial banks take less risk and receive government support, and investment banks take more and get zilch.
So far, it’s clear; we’re not going down that road with this commission.
The CEO’s punted every single question on anything that mattered in terms of the link between their practices and the crisis (the entire point of the commission). They deflected questions on leverage, trading revenue breakdowns, and on the amount of standard OTC derivatives (over-the-counter; think generic pharmaceuticals) vs. non-standard ones (which the bankers referred to as ‘bespoke,’ basically tailored—think expensive exotic pharmaceuticals). The equivalent of the-dog-ate-my-homework excuse was given no reprimand, just a polite, okay, well, get back to us when you have that information.
You could cast blame, share blame, whatever. But, the reason some banks went bankrupt and some almost did, once you wipe away all the complex lingo, was that they didn’t have enough money (capital) to back their bets (complex securities stuffed with various mixes of mortgage loans, packages of loans and credit derivatives). This should be the crux of the commission’s investigation. How did that happen, who did it, how can we make sure it won’t happen again? Show us your numbers first, then we’ll talk.
